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A. The future is a foreign country: the infeasibility of reliance upon traditional 
practice 
 
Any teaching practice must be informed by some model, or models, of learning. There 
must be some “theory” of how teaching brings about learning. The model of learning 
that informs practice does not have to be articulate, or logically coherent, or 
empirically sound. Cultural transmission within formal social institutions obviously 
pre-dates modern learning theory, there are texts from Pharaonic times that deal with 
formal teaching and learning. Naïve models of learning tend to view the problem as 
one of transmission from teacher to student. Sophisticated models recognise the need 
to rediscover or recreate meaning in the process of communication between teacher 
and learner.  
 
The need for some model of learning is important because traditional practices cannot 
be reproduced reliably under the stresses of changing circumstances. Higher 
Education is subject to several pressures. Some pressures have been specific to the 
UK, others have had effects across the common law world, and some have impacted 
across the whole world. Specific to the UK we have seen changes to educational 
                                                 

 Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University. 
2 
processes in schools and colleges, the increases in student numbers, and the rolling 
out of quality control regimes across Higher Education. Pressures felt in legal 
education across the common law world, include the internationalisation of legal 
practice, specialisation in legal practice, the ever-increasing supplies of legal materials 
that need to be selected from. Finally, impacting across Higher Educational 
institutions across the world, there are the fears around international competition, the 
consensus of the importance of the knowledge economy, and an economically 
important market in overseas students. Whether considered separately or together 
these circumstances mean that reliance upon traditional methods, curricula, and their 
associated unarticulated models of educational process and learning, is no longer a 
viable strategy.  
 
 
As John Dewey noted:
1
  
 
“I think that only slight acquaintance with the history of education is 
needed to prove that educational reformers and innovators alone have felt 
the need for a philosophy of education.” 
 
As existing practice is sanctioned by past practice it is not under any burden to justify 
itself through articulation of its model of learning. Whatever the model is, the fact that 
it has worked demonstrates it is either correct, or if incorrect has not prevented 
successful educational processes occurring. Indeed, if the model is incorrect it makes 
the alteration of any feature of the traditional practice hazardous, as the effectiveness 
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may be the result of practices that are not formally emphasised. Traditional practice is 
self-validating, but novelty requires justification, as was again noted by Dewey:
2
  
 
“Those who adhered to the established system needed merely a few fine 
sounding words to justify existing practices. The real work was done by 
habits which were so fixed as to be institutional. The lesson for 
progressive education is that it requires in an urgent degree, a degree more 
pressing than was incumbent upon former innovators, a philosophy of 
education based upon a philosophy of experience”  
 
Thus, we are unable to continue in our traditional practice, and this creates a need to 
articulate a model of learning that can guide us in developing legal education in the 
future. There are strong reason to suppose that the learning theory of John Dewey is 
the place to look for such a model.
3
 
 
B. An introduction to Dewey’s philosophy, educational theory, and 
contemporary relevance. 
 
Dewey was an “instrumentalist” or “pragmatist” in his approach to philosophical 
questions. When this philosophical approach was applied to education it produced a 
model of learning as an aspect of experience. The learner has an end in view, and 
takes some action intended to bring her closer to the desired end. There is then some 
consequence of the action, a consequence that is productive, neutral, or counter 
productive. It is in reacting to the consequences of action and deliberating upon 
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further action that reflection takes place, and it is the quality of this reflection that 
determines the educational benefits that are derived from the experience.  
 
The model informing Dewey‟s pragmatism was the experimental method which he 
generalised. Dewey placed inquiry at the centre of his analysis of knowledge.
4
 These 
features made his methodology open ended, his pragmatism was provisional in its 
conclusions. Furthermore, his methodology was informed by his belief in progress, 
not as a preordained destiny but as a realisable potential, and progressive or 
developmental assumption also precluded his asserting any final arrival of truth. 
 
These philosophical concerns fed into Dewey‟s approach to the process of education. 
For Dewey learning is something a learner does in the course of attempting to achieve 
some goal. Dewey expressed this as learning through experience, essentially learning 
that is motivated by needing the knowledge or technique learnt in order to overcome 
some problem encountered in moving towards a desirable goal. The educative process 
works best when the goal is spontaneously that of the learner. The role of the educator 
is to direct the process, direction that is informed by the educator‟s expertise, so that it 
might have the best educational outcome. Education for Dewey was the joint 
endeavour to achieve a goal, using whatever resources of native wit, or accumulated 
knowledge, available to the partners in the endeavour.  
 
Dewey saw education as a process that over time brought about developmental 
progression in the learner. He viewed education as centred on the development of the 
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learner as a self-conscious problem solver. Just as pragmatism did not aspire to 
ultimate truth, the educative process had no natural terminus.  
 
The educational process obviously operates in a social setting, and is justified by 
social needs. The development of the individual learner was not opposed to, but an 
aspect of, the reproduction of society, and its distinctive culture. Dewey in the early 
years of the twentieth century in the United States of America was writing in a period 
of tumultuous social and technical transformation, an age of change. Any model of 
education that tried to limit itself to the knowledge of the last generation was palpably 
inadequate, and Dewey‟s educational theory reflected this.  
 
Emphasis upon the learner, an emphasis displayed to a marked degree by Dewey, and 
the need to teach with relevance to the learner, the very core of Dewey‟s approach, 
are clichés of modern educational discourse. The social basis of education has been 
brought home by developments in Higher Education that have emphasised the 
accountability and economic utility of educational institutions. Social and economic 
uncertainty are as prevalent today as 100 years ago. The consensus is that it is not the 
actual information taught but the ability to find and intelligently use information for 
the solution of problems that is of the essence for Higher Education today.  In short, 
we live in an age that is profoundly post-Dewey. Our discussions about education are 
suffused with ideas, approaches, and even language that are derived from the work of 
Dewey. However, the argument of this article goes beyond suggesting that familiarity 
with the work of Dewey illuminates modern education discourse. It is argued that an 
application of Dewey‟s models of education and learning to contemporary practice in 
the Law School is useful.  
6 
 
 
 
Dewey can provide an alternative model to the classic „liberal‟ ideal of the 
undergraduate degree.
5
 His approach to educational processes is broad enough to 
encompass educational goals at the highest levels of generality. This is despite the fact 
that in his writing and practice Dewey was primarily concerned with education within 
schools rather than Higher Education. Neither his model of learning, nor his approach 
to curriculum, was limited to children. Indeed, Dewey‟s idea of the effects of 
education on the learner was:
6
 
 
 “…the result of the educative process is capacity for further education”; 
 
and in similar vein his approach to the process of education was:
7
  
 
“(i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; and that (ii) the 
educational process is one of continual reorganisation, reconstructing, 
transforming”;  
 
and his formal definition of education was:
8
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“It is that reconstruction or reorganisation of experience which adds to the 
meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of 
subsequent experience”.  
 
Thus, despite Dewey‟s well-known use of concepts of growth and development there 
is nothing that limits his theory of learning to children, the growth and development 
he refers to do not culminate in biological maturity.  
 
We can identify Dewey as a father of experiential learning. Dewey‟s analysis has of 
course influenced many subsequent theorists and much of contemporary educational 
practice. Kolb‟s learning cycle is fairly obviously a refinement of Dewey‟s analysis of 
learning through doing.
9
 To anyone who has experience of real client clinical legal 
education it is obvious that Dewey‟s ideal is realised in law clinic work. This aligns 
Dewey‟s approach with one contemporary approach to legal education, and a 
powerful one in professional education in particular. However, if Dewey is going to 
serve us generally then his problem solving approach needs to be applicable outside 
of clinical legal education, even giving that term its broadest definition. 
 
 
C. Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy and legal education have important features in 
common 
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Law is a social phenomena, and finds its meaning in social practices. Law that fails in 
its social purpose is likely to become not law,
10
 or to be interpreted into oblivion,
11
 or 
left as a rule that is never applicable.
12
 The link between vitality (and in extremis 
validity) and usefulness for purpose harmonises with the pragmatic approach to 
knowledge. Pragmatic philosophy does not depend upon any objective relation of 
“reference” between statement and the world for truth. Truth is provisional and 
situational. Truth is situational because if the belief helps attain the end of the social 
activity (including science – an activity concerned with explanation and predication) 
then it is considered true. However, subsequent events might demonstrate it is not 
true, meaning the belief is only provisionally true. To the author this approach to truth 
in general is very similar to the manner in which the law deals with legal correctness 
(a statement of law is usually referred to as “correct” or “incorrect” rather than “true” 
or “false”). There is a harmonious approach to issues of validation of beliefs or 
statements in law and pragmatic thought. This tends to make pragmatic models of 
learning and educative processes a comfortable fit for legal education. 
 
It is not necessary to rely upon arguments about types of reasoning and natural 
consilience. There is express textual confirmation in the work of Dewey of the 
concurrence of law and his epistemological approach. The following quote is taken 
from Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, the work in which Dewey explained his approach 
to knowledge. Knowledge for Dewey is that which inquiry produces, it is the product 
of a type of social activity rather than a belief that has peculiar qualities (i.e. a belief 
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that is “true”). As inquiry is an open ended process, so too is the status of any belief as 
knowledge. The paradigms of social inquiry that produces knowledge used by Dewey 
were art and law:
13
 
 
“Two outstanding instances [of formal properties accruing to subject 
matter –part of Dewey‟s universal model of inquiry that explains the 
relationship between logic and the world] are provided by art and law … 
The materials of legal regulation are transactions occurring in the ordinary 
activities of human beings and groups of human beings; transactions of a 
sort that are engaged in apart from law. As certain aspects and phases of 
these transactions are legally formalised, conceptions such as 
misdemeanor, crime, torts, contracts and so on arise … But when they are 
formed they are also formative; they regulate the proper conduct of the 
activities out of which they develop.” 
 
Thus, the approach of Dewey to educational process is very likely to be adaptable to 
legal education because he started with law as an exemplar and generalised typical 
aspects of legal practice. Applying Dewey to legal education is to reverse the process, 
moving from general to specific. 
 
 
Law and pragmatic philosophy share a tendency to use social purposes as the source 
of a “telos” in a teleological pattern of reasoning. In other words law and pragmatic 
philosophy each seek justification by social purposes or values. In this they can share 
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a common weakness, of treating the social “good” as given and focussing entirely 
upon the means to achieve the “good”. This can produce a social engineering or 
technocratic view of problems that can be authoritarian in its impact. However, this 
common feature can also generate a common strength, providing the nature of the 
social “good” is recognised as disputable. It allows for, in terms of generality, a mid 
level range of “ought” to be identified which is a crucial area for law. The focus is not 
upon the nature of the ultimate “good”, this question is pitched at too high a level of 
generality. Such issues fall more comfortably into discourses not in law but in politics 
or ethics or philosophy. Nor is the focus on the unique features of the specific 
disputants, this would be at too low a level of generality, an approach castigated by 
Llewellyn as “fireside equities”.14 
 
The appropriate focus for much of law is at this intermediate level focussing upon 
such issues as legitimate and illegitimate, or effective and ineffective, or consonant 
and discordant, means of moving towards the “good”. Obviously, if numerous 
“goods” are recognised the analysis quickly becomes complex, as it has to operate 
across two types of variable. There are issues of choice of means in approaching a 
“good” and quite distinct types of issue around choice of “good”. The law often has to 
balance “goods” that are in conflict, such as justice and efficiency, and that may be 
ultimately incommensurable.
15
 So far as law has this characteristic then legal thought 
and process can be modelled in the same manner as Dewey‟s educational process. 
Potentially this allows for the making of links between what is taught and how it is 
taught.  
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D. Teaching law through a problem solving paradigm 
 
If education proceeds by searching for the solution to a problem, and law is 
determined at the level of “ought” by the manner in which it addresses a problem, 
then the process of solution seeking can be the elucidation of the law. Traditional 
legal educational practice reflects this by the stress it puts upon the problem question. 
The law is understood in its operation not by its exposition. In order to demonstrate 
understanding we require the application of law to imaginary factual scenarios. Our 
practice as legal educators has been to teach (and assess) through a consideration of 
how law impacts upon (fictional) legally responsible agents.  
 
The problem question approach to learning the law is certainly consonant with an 
experiential model, although it is not the same. It demands an imaginative and 
empathic act from the learner, although our practice does not always recognise this, 
nor does it always allow for the difficulties such a projection poses for students.
16
 It 
requires the student to adopt the view of a fictional character and it imposes a problem 
upon the learner rather than accepting the learner‟s problem as the source of the 
process. It uses a static problem scenario. The situation is not open to redefinition in 
the course of the process, the client will not change their views, new evidence will not 
be available, alternative solutions to the conflict will not be capable of being created, 
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the question is a “given”. Finally, the problem question rarely involves the action of 
the student in moving towards a solution to the problem, it is unusual to ask the 
student to draft a document that could alleviate or solve the problem, nor to identify a 
negotiating position that the fictional advice could point towards. The clinical model 
of legal education removes, or limits, these divergences between the experiential 
process Dewey posits and the problem question. It replaces the fictional characters 
with real people, or with people playing roles, and thus avoids or reduces the 
imaginative and empathic demands on the student. It either has real open ended 
problems, in the form of real clients, or attempts to simulate the same. Finally, it is far 
more likely to demand actions from the students that are directed towards seeking a 
resolution of the problem.  
 
The problem question and the clinical problem are capable of being viewed as points 
upon a continuum. The nature of the continuum can be described as a “problem 
solving”, or “instrumental”, or “teleological”, or “pragmatic”, or “inquiry based” 
activity. Placing educational practice onto such a continuum suggests Dewey can be 
used to move from a familiar position towards a more satisfactory position. As is 
appropriate the possibility is transformation rather than revolutionary. The analysis 
also allows us to discriminate between the different aspects of the problem question 
and clinical continuum.  
 
Below is a schematic for reviewing legal education practice in the light of the problem 
solving or inquiry based model of Dewey. This analysis was derived from Dewey by 
13 
the author.
17
 As argued above change in legal education is inevitable. The schematic 
is intended to provide an evaluative continuum for assessing change and for 
enhancing coherence in the process of change. The schematic has seven operations. 
 
(i) Imposing an educational purpose on the problem.
18
 
 
The teacher has to decide at some time what the educational purpose of the problem is 
for the student. This educational purpose is not the same as the purpose of the student 
in trying to “solve” the problem. It is a “meta” purpose, the purpose of the purpose. 
Hence, one might design a problem scenario in which a student is asked to help 
someone remain in occupation of his home. However, the educational purpose 
ultimately served might be an understanding by the student of the operation of the law 
of mortgages. One aims to achieve the “meta” purpose in the student‟s cognition 
through the student pursuing her immediate purpose, a purpose that is achieved by 
addressing the immediate concrete problem. Deciding what the problem is “for” is 
always necessary. However, the degree of control possible over the content of the 
problem can vary. The problem may be designed solely for its educational purpose, or 
the educational purpose may be imposed upon a problem that is not directly under the 
control of the teacher. 
 
Identification of the issues raised by the problem is not inherent but imposed. The 
imposition is one of meaning, why the problem is interesting, what the problem is 
                                                 
17
 Specifically from: The Reflex Arc in Psychology (1896) reprinted in McDermott (1981) The 
Philosophy of John Dewey, University of Chicago Press, Chicago; Democracy and Education (1916), 
Macmillan Company, New York reprinted by Free Press, Toronto, Ontario (1966); Experience and 
Education, (1938) Macmillan Co, New York, reprinted by Collier Macmillan, London (1963); Logic: 
The Theory of Inquiry (1938), Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc: reprinted in McDermott (1981). 
18
 This aspect of curriculum design will be explored in a forthcoming article: We Should Look to Legal 
Theory to Inform the Teaching of Substantive Law [2009] 2 WebJCLI. 
14 
about. Who imposes, and why, the particular level of analysis that is imposed, and 
how the imposition is effected, are all questions of importance. If the student feels 
involved in this process then that student is far more likely to feel personally involved 
in the educative process. If the student does not understand what the problem is 
“about”, why it is “about” the issues identified by the teacher, then the material is 
probably going to be perceived as randomly arranged. Ideally students are led to 
making an appropriate classification of the problem for themselves. Without guidance 
the problem is unlikely to be a useful learning opportunity. There are strong pressures 
towards an authoritative imposition of meaning by the teacher upon the learner, such 
authoritative imposition economises on resources, and allows for maximum 
standardisation.  
 
One advantage of a live clinical approach to problem selection is that the process of 
imposing meaning upon the problem is both apparent and negotiated. Students tend to 
want to help clients. The imposition of meaning is mediated by the question: “how 
can you help them as a lawyer?” The imposition of meaning through social role seems 
to be natural to people, it does not feel arbitrary because it is informed by social 
practice. When the problem is wholly the conceit of the teacher there is a real risk of 
authorial blindness: “it is about what I say it is about because I wrote it about that”. 
As the imposition of meaning occurs before the student ever becomes involved there 
can be no negotiation of meaning, it must be imposed by fiat.  
 
(ii) Formal classification of the elements of the problem 
 
15 
The lawyer imposes a classification on social activity, and thereby seeks to control it. 
People go shopping, or catch a bus. Law imposes its own formal names onto such 
activities, and then reifies. Lawyers “see” a “sale of goods”, instigated by an “offer” 
effected by passing an item to the operator of a cash register for scanning, or a 
“contract for services” instigated by an “offer” effected by a pensioner showing his 
bus pass to the bus driver. It will be recalled that it was this aspect of law that Dewey 
used as an illustration of what he considered to be a general characteristic of human 
reasoning. 
 
The classification takes place at different levels of generality and is effected by legal 
terms and concepts. It can be hard to perceive social activity without “perceiving” the 
formal classification once the process has been learnt, classification becomes 
unconscious. As people are self-conscious and know of law the classification has an 
effect upon social action. People alter their behaviour in response to their 
understanding of the law.  This reflective aspect of law confirms the belief in a reified 
“offer” that led to a “contract” as a social fact a belief that the “offer” exists in the 
world, rather than as a formal quality imposed by lawyers on the social world. 
 
Within a clinical model of education this classification is partially articulated in terms 
of work area. One assigns a client, or client problem, to matrimonial, or personal 
injury, or conveyancing etc. In traditional legal education classification tends not to be 
articulated at all. Rather it is assumed to be inherent in the “subject” being studied, 
and becomes ossified in stereotypical features of the problem question form. 
Classification is often determinative of analysis, and it is an area that all current 
models tend to neglect or treat as non-teachable. 
16 
 
 
(iii) Discrimination 
 
This might be termed the first stage of “legal analysis”, and is often under-articulated. 
The task is the selection of features present in the situation to focus upon, such 
features may be “factual” or “legal” or mixed. Selection is an active process that is 
driven by the purpose of selection e.g. client need, or the policy imperatives that are in 
operation, or by an awareness of the need to balance conflicting “goods”, or by the 
demands of social efficiency or of fairness etc. 
 
Typically a lot of the work of discrimination is carried out before the formal start of 
analysis – it is viewed as an issue of apprehension rather than one of reasoning. 
Therefore, it is unusual to attempt to teach discrimination formally or to assess for it 
specifically. However, if the analysis does not proceed on the basis of an appropriate 
discrimination then it will be incoherent. It is very difficult to explain what is 
“obvious” in a situation when a student cannot “see” the same. Discrimination, the 
ignoring of most of the events that take place around us, is an essential and continuous 
part of our conscious functioning. Legal discrimination is necessary as unless some 
features are identified as the important or “material” features for law there can be no 
effective generalisation, and no law as opposed to due process. 
 
Within clinical models discrimination is de facto considered in terms of process and 
information gathering. Within traditional models it is often implicit within accounts of 
17 
“what the law is about”, a generalised exposition intended to help students identify the 
important features of a situation. 
 
(iv) Analysis 
 
The centre of traditional practice, “formal” analysis of legal concepts made concrete 
in their application to particular facts. Analytically, it is a reversal of the classification 
stage of analysis, when social action was formalised by the imposition of legal 
classifications. It is the reflective aspect of the process of inquiry identified by 
Dewey, the legal formality will now impact upon the social reality. It is the formal 
aspects of the activity that will be determinative of its legal treatment. 
 
This process is at the heart of the “black letter law” tradition in academic law. Often 
described as the “application” of the law. It proceeds by the use of a scheme of 
questions that are logically related to each other, and are derived from authoritative 
statements of the law. It is an analytical process, by which is meant it consists of the 
asking of a standard series of questions in a logical order. The basic pattern is 
algorithmic – keep going through the same process in correct order. Ideally the law is 
sufficiently articulated and discriminating that it can produce an answer through legal 
analysis in any set of circumstances. The re-iteration of a series of questions over a 
shifting set of circumstances generates a casuistic body of discourse. Usually, the 
answers to earlier questions in the series determine the order, or relevance, of later 
questions. The nature of the exercise is the manipulation of symbols, usually words. 
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The discourses generated by this type of analysis are typically legal. The language 
used is characteristic of legal discourse. The distinctive texts of common law legal 
culture, cases and commentaries, are exercises in this form of discourse. A belief that 
the discourse is independent of social activities – that the discourse is self-justifying 
and complete in itself – is an occupational hazard of the lawyer. This belief is surely 
untenable, and it has been denounced on many occasions. As a working hypothesis it 
allows for an intensity of focus that can produce legal work of the highest quality. As 
an article of faith it distorts reason and prevents the believer from apprehending the 
alternatives present in a situation. 
 
The traditional model is as its strongest in this area. Indeed, the discourses produced 
from this stage of problem solving are “the law” in common understanding. Clinical 
models, operating at a lower level of generality, necessarily incorporate an analytical 
stage. However, it can be difficult to raise the level of generality, students can 
struggle to generalise and even to see the point of trying to generalise. 
 
(v) Action 
 
Traditional law school practice devotes very little attention to post analytical 
concerns. Although rubrics often direct that advice be given it is unusual for the 
content of the advice to be central. This relative neglect is not sustainable within a 
clinical setting. Although there is a danger that action might become stereotypical and 
pre-determined within a clinical setting there must be some form of action taken, even 
if it is giving up.  
 
19 
If Dewey is correct and we learn in order to solve problems then neglect of the 
remedial aspect of law must make the study of law barren. If learners are predisposed 
to view information as meaningful so far as it is useful then neglecting the use of the 
law in solving problems undermines the educational process. It invites a view of the 
law as empty ritual and recitation, absent its social effects law is a badly written body 
of dogmatic belief. 
 
(vi) Result 
 
Obviously, the taking of action leads to some response or is futile. This aspect of the 
study of law is often woefully neglected. Even clinical modes of delivery often fail to 
fully take into account the radical uncertainty that surrounds professional action. 
Within the traditional law school this aspect of law is sometimes treated in the guise 
of “effectiveness” of law.  
 
Learners do not take action merely from the need to express themselves. The action is 
directed towards an end, the solution of a problem. The most convincing lessons are 
those that come from the success or failure of actions directed towards some purpose. 
The reality for clients, legal practitioners, legislators, and for legal scholars is that law 
and legal processes will often not produce the results desired for a thousand and one 
reasons.  
 
(vii) Response 
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An action leaves the world in a new state, it has an effect, however small or large it 
may be. Life is continuous as is the learning process. If the result is not what was 
desired then should we change the action taken or change the type of solution that is 
acceptable? If the action taken has been successful in some manner what has it left 
undone, or what pressure has it created, or what unintended consequences have also 
occurred?  
 
For this aspect of the learning cycle the traditional law school approach has the 
theoretical advantage over clinical models. It is possible to design clinical exercises 
that are concerned with problems of responses to actions taken. However, the focus 
on the particular problem and the timescale of instruction militate against effective 
clinical approaches to the issue. Here the greater generality of the traditional law 
school allows for the delineation of the problem. Such issues are often raised implictly 
in law schools, when a historical account of legal developments is entered into. 
However, almost universally the treatment of responses to legal actions, such as 
doctrinal developments, is as an expositive tool rather than as focus of inquiry.  
 
E. Conclusion 
 
Dewey offers legal scholars a theory of learning that is influential, consonant with the 
instincts of many legal scholars, and is consistent with the substantive materials that 
law schools are concerned with. Furthermore, his model allows us to integrate 
accounts of legal education and compare the strengths and weaknesses of alternative 
modes of delivery of legal materials. This is of particular value as there is a strong and 
irrational tendency to view modes of delivery as determined by “stage” of legal 
21 
education. Finally, Dewey‟s understanding of the learner and the learning process 
allows legal scholars to approach the necessary task of curriculum renewal with ideas 
of how change might improve, rather than simply disrupt, legal teaching. This article 
has tried to explain why the synergies exist, and illustrate through demonstration how 
effective Dewey can be in giving us the tools we need to analyse and enhance our 
practice. 
 
 
